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Conflicts Between Treaties and Subsequently Enacted 
Statutes in Belgium: Etat Belge v. S.A.. "Fromagerie 
Franco-Suisse Le Ski" 
In Etat Belge v. S.A. "Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski,"1 the 
Supreme Court of Belgium was faced with a conflict between a pro-
vision of the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty and a 
domestic law enacted subsequent to Belgian ratification of the treaty. 
The traditional approach in Belgium-and, incidentally, the rule 
in the United States2-had been to give effect to whichever was en-
acted later in time. Although not stated explicitly in any constitu-
tional provision, this rule had been well settled in Belgium.8 
In Fromagerie, the plaintiff corporation sought to recover certain 
taxes that it had paid to the Belgian government in order to obtain 
the right to import dairy products into Belgium from the other 
member states of the EEC. The taxes were levied pursuant to several 
royal decrees issued after January 1, 1958, the date on which the EEC 
treaty came into effect. In 1964, the European Court of Justice, which 
interprets the EEC treaty, held the Belgian taxes to be in violation 
of article 12,4 which provides that member states are to refrain from 
introducing between themselves any new customs duties, or charges 
with an equivalent effect, on imports or exports and to refrain from 
increasing existing charges. 5 
After the European Court's decision, the royal decrees were abro-
gated. This abrogation, however, was without retroactive effect, and, 
in addition, a law of March 19, 1968, provided that all payments 
made pursuant to the decrees prior to their repeal were irrevocable; 
this law further stated that those who made the payments could not 
seek a refund before any authority.6 
The trial court at Brussels held that the 1968 law should prevail 
I. [1971) Journal des Tribunaux 460, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8141 (Cour de 
Cassation, Jre Chambre, Belg. 1971). 
2. By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like 
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both arc declared by that instrument to be the 
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. 
When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe 
them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language 
of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the last one in date will control the other, 
provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 163-64 (1972). 
3. See M. WAELBROECK, TRAJTES INTERNATIONAUX ET JURISDICTIONS INTERNES DANS LES 
PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN 271 (1969). 
4. Commission of the EEC v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 8: Kingdom of Belgium, 
IO Requeil 1217, [1961-1966 Court Decisions Transfer Binder] CCH CO!'IUII. MKT, REP, 
11 8028 (Ct. of Justice of the European Communities, Nov. 13, 1964). 
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, art. 
12, 298 U.N.T.S. 19. 
6. Law of March 19, 1968, [1968] Recueil des Lois et Arretc!s 1162 (Belg.). 
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and denied the plaintiff recovery.7 On appeal, this judgment was re-
versed.8 The Belgian government appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the 
refund of the taxes. 
Established Belgian law would seem to have required a holding 
that the law of March 19, 1968, was superior to any provision of the 
1958 EEC treaty. Two concepts underlie this conclusion.9 First, an 
international treaty that is approved by both houses of the legislature 
is, through that approval, assimilated into the law and thereby made 
the equivalent of a national Iaw.10 The concept of equivalence en-
ables courts to assert jurisdiction over controversies involving treaties, 
for, jurisdictionally, Belgian courts can only review violations of 
Belgian law. It also permits judicial rather than executive interpreta-
tion of treaties. In contrast, the concept of equivalence is foreign to 
the French and Dutch systems, in which treaties are superior to 
laws.11 In France, for example, interpretations of treaties by the ex-
ecutive are binding on the courts.12 
Second, article 107 of the Belgian Constitution states that "[t]he 
courts and tribunals shall apply executive decrees and ordinances, 
whether general, provincial, or local, only so far as they conform to 
the laws."18 This article has been construed as excluding judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of laws;14 there is traditionally no ju-
dicial review of legislative acts under the Belgian scheme of sepa-
ration of powers. 
These two concepts would seem to require the superiority of a 
subsequent national law over a conflicting treaty provision. First, 
7. See Salmon, Le conflit entre le traite international et la loi interne en Belgique 
a la suite de l'arret rendu le 27 mai 1971 par la Cour de cassation, [1971) Journal des 
Tribunaux 529, 530. 
8. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski" v. Etat Belge, [1970) Journal des Tribu-
naux 413 (Cour d'Appel, 2me chambre, Belg. 1970). 
9. See generally Pescatore, Cour de Cassation (Belg.), 27 mai 1971, Etat belge c. S.A. 
"Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski," in 1971 CAHIERS DES DRorrs EUROP.EENS 561, 572. 
10. Rigaux, Les conflits de la loi nationale avec les traites intemationaux, in RAP-
PORTS BELCES AU Vlle CONCRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 269, 274, 277 (Uppsala, 
1966). 
11. The French Constitution provides that "[t]reaties or agreements duly ratified 
or approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of laws, 
subject, for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party." CoNSTlTU· 
noN art. 55 (Fr. 1958). (In this Note all unattributed translations are the author's.) 
The Constitution of The Netherlands provides that "[l]egislation in force within the 
Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be incompatible with treaties that 
according to their terms can be binding on anyone and that have been entered into 
either before or after the enactment of such legislation." GRONDWET (Constitution) art. 
66 (Neth. 1956). . 
12. Rigaux, supra note 10, at 277. 
13. LA CONSTITOTION BEi.GE art. 107 (Belg. 1831). 
14. De Visscher, Rapport de synthese, in L'ADAl'TATION DE LA CoNSfITUTION BELGE AUX 
REALlTES INTERNATIONALES 95, 120 n.19 (1966). 
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since a treaty is deemed to be the equivalent of a law, when it comes 
into conflict with another domestic law the principle lex posterior 
derogat legi priori-the most recent provision in time prevails--
should govern.15 Second, since the judiciary does not have the power 
to review the constitutionality of laws, a fortiori it cannot refuse to 
apply laws that are in conflict with treaty provisions, which are at best 
merely the equivalent of laws.16 Therefore, traditional doctrine sug-
gests that any provision of a law enacted after a treaty takes effect 
should prevail over any contrary treaty provision. 
In some cases the judiciary could avoid becoming an accomplice 
to the legislature's disregard of a treaty provision, even under the 
established doctrine. A Belgian court would attempt to construe a 
treaty and a subsequent domestic law in such a way as to avoid a con-
flict and give effect to both.17 The court presumes that the legislature 
did not intend to abrogate an international agreement. Where the 
purpose of the national law, however, was to modify the domestic 
effect of the treaty, the court could not explain the conflict away. 
The avoidance device was used by the appeals court in Fromagerie 
as a basis for its decision,18 but the Supreme Court explicitly found 
that the law and the treaty conflicted.19 
Most authorities considered the established doctrine so ingrained 
that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to effect a 
change.20 An amendment was proposed as far back as 1953, but it 
was rejected on the grounds that permitting the courts to deny the 
application of subsequent national laws that are incompatible with 
treaties would be letting judges "meddle in the affairs of the legis-
lative and executive branches."21 Several other amendements have 
since been proposed, none of which has ever been submitted to a 
vote. All have died in a parliamentary committee, but not always 
because of what they proposed. One recent failure can be attributed 
to the linguistic dispute between the French and Flemish com-
munities.22 Other amendments were perhaps too far-reaching in that 
15. Rigaux, supra note 10, at 279. 
16. See Masquelin, L'action reciproque des traites et des lois, 13 ANNALES DE DROIT 
ET DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES, No. 52, at 133, 150 (1953). 
17. M. WAELBROECK, supra note 3, at 279. Cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 
(1933). 
18. [1970] Journal des Tribunaux at 413. 
19. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 474, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,I 8141, at 7620. 
20. See M. WAELBROECK, supra note 3, at 276-77. 
21. Id. at 271 n.142, quoting 1952-53 DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTAIRES, Chambre, No. 693, 
at 54-55. 
22. De Visscher, Les positions actuelles de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence belges a 
l'egard du confiit entre le traite et la loi, in REcuEIL D'.ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN 
HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 605,607 (1968). 
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they included the larger notion of supremacy of "the general•princi-
ples of international law."23 
In Fromagerie the Supreme Court held, without the aid of a 
constitutional amendment, that when the conflict is between a rule 
of domestic law and a rule of international treaty law that has direct 
effect within the domestic legal order, the latter rule must prevail. 
The effects of the law of March 19, 1968, were thus stayed in so far 
as the law was in conflict with a directly applicable provision of the 
EEC treaty. This holding raises at least two general questions: How 
did the Court deal with the traditional doctrine, and how far does 
this new principle of pre-eminence extend? 
As for dealing with the traditional doctrine, the Court made no 
mention of precedent either in support of, or in opposition to, its 
decision. Although the prior doctrine was well settled, there was 
very little case law on the subject. The main authority was to be 
found in a 1925 Supreme Court decision concerning the Treaty of 
Versailles.24 This case, however, had been interpreted narrowly. In 
1963, Raoul Hayoit de Termicourt, Procureur General pres de la 
Cour de Cassation, had analyzed the pertinent language in the 
decision and concluded that the Court referred only to nonself-
executing treaty provisions25-in which case there would be no con-
flict. An examination of the Court's language supports Hayoit de 
Termicourt's interpretation: "It is the Belgian legislator's role, when 
he enacts dispositions in execution of an international convention, to 
judge the compliance of the rules which he adopts with the treaty 
obligations binding Belgium; the courts do not have the power to 
refuse to apply a law on the ground that it would not, supposedly, 
1?e consistent with these obligations."26 A subsequent Supreme Court 
23. For example, one proposal to amend article 107 of the Belgian Constitution pro-
vided that "[t]hey (the courts and tribunals) shall apply the laws only if they conform 
to the rules of general international law as well as to the rules established by or by 
virtue of treaties in effect and regularly published." De Visscher, supra note 14, at 120. 
24. Schieble v. Procureur General a Bruxelles et Campion, [1926] Pasicrisie beige I, 
76 (Cour de Cassation, Ire chambre, Belg. 1925). 
25. Hayoit de Termicourt, Le Conflit traitt!-loi interne, [1963] Journal des Tribunaux 
481, 483. 
A nonself-executing treaty is one that is not intended to, and does not, take effect 
domestically until the legislature enacts enabling legislation. Foster &,Elam v. Neilson, 
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829): 
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to 
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever 
it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms 
of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform 
a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for 
the court. 
26. Schieble v. Procureur General a Bruxelles et Campion, [1926] Pasicrisie beige I, 
76, 77 (Cour de Cassation, Ire chambre, Belg. 1925) (emphasis added). 
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decision held that the nonself-executing provision of the Geneva 
Convention on the Rules of the Road of 1949 was superseded by a 
subsequent Belgian law because the Convention did not grant to 
citizens of the contracting nations any rights or obligations.27 The 
implication is that the treaty might have prevailed had its provisions 
been self-executing-specifically, had its provisions granted rights to 
Belgian citizens. This reading lends support to Hayoit de Termi-
court's view, which, incidently, has been accepted by many au-
thorities.28 
In the absence of precedent, there remains the question of where 
the Court found the power to arrive at its decision in light of the 
concept of equivalence and in light of article I 07 of the Belgian 
Constitution. In dealing with the concept of equivalence, the Court 
remarked that, even when consent to a treaty, required by article 68, 
paragraph 2, of the Constitution, is given in the form of a law, the 
legislature in enacting that law is not performing a legislative func-
tion. 29 One commentator has noted that when the Belgian Parliament 
approves a treaty, it is engaging in an act of political control.30 The 
Court adopted the analysis of Ganshof van der Meersch, Procureur-
general of the Court, who, in his statement to the Court, 81 argued 
that, according to article 68 of the Constitution, treaties are the work 
of the executive branch of the government: "The King makes trea-
ties." Parliament, he said, merely gives its consent to the treaty, thus 
allowing it to take effect within the country. The source of the rules 
of law embodied in the treaty is not the act of consent given by the 
legislature but the act of assent by the states as represented by mem-
bers of their executive branches.32 In essence, the Court limited the 
concept of equivalence to its basic purpose-specifically, to give the 
courts jurisdiction over treaty-related problems. Since a treaty is not 
to be treated as a law for all purposes, the Court concluded that the 
conflict between a treaty and a subsequent national law can no 
longer be reduced to a conflict between two laws.83 Consequently, 
the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori is not controlling. 
Having thus dealt directly with the concept of equivalence, the 
Court did not address the question of its power under the Constitu-
tion to hold article 12 of the treaty superior to a subsequent national 
law. The Court seemed implicitly to deny the existence of any consti-
27. Ananou C. Defauw et Ploegaerts, [1964] Pasicrisie belge I, 849 (Cour de Cassation, 
2me chambre, Belg. 1964). 
28. See de Visscher, supra note 14, at 120 n.5. 
29. (1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 473, 2 CCH COMM, MKT. REP. 11 8141, at '7620, 
30. Pescatore, supra note 9, at 579. 
31, [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 461-'71. 
32. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 463. 
33. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 473, 2 CCH COMM. MKT, REP. 11 8141, at '7620, 
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tutional barriers to its decision. Paul de Visscher has pointed out 
that no constitutional provision required the courts to give effect to 
a law that was enacted in violation of a treaty.34 Also, Ganshof van 
der Meersch reminded the Court that no express constitutional pro-
vision is necessary to give the Court the power it sought, since the 
Belgian constitutional system is not rigid, but is situated midway 
between a ·written and an unwritten system.85 He also noted that no 
constitutional provision deals with the possible conflict between a 
treaty and a subsequent law.36 
Once this analysis had been accepted the conflict between treaty 
and national law could no longer be resolved by simply giving effect 
to the one later in time. The Court found the treaty superior because 
of "the very nature of international treaty law."37 This is perhaps the 
most striking aspect of the Court's decision. What is the "very nature" 
of international treaty law that allows it to prevail over all national 
legislation? 
Ganshof van der Meersch argued that it is the state's duty to make 
certain that its international commitments, the contracts it enters 
into with other states, are not violated by its own organs.38 This duty 
falls upon the legislator as well as upon the judge since legislative de-
cisions cannot relieve the state from these obligations.39 A corollary 
to this duty is the superiority of the rule of international law, made 
by contract, over the rule of domestic law. The superiority of internal 
law would deny the jural existence of the international commitment. 
Van der Meersch concludes: 
The submission of the State-and thus of its laws-to interna-
tional law, in its interstate :relations, finds its basis in the international 
legal order. This submission implies the preeminence of the rule of 
international law over the rule of internal law. 
The superiority of the treaty is justified as an act expressing a rule 
of international law whose nature is contractual; the State which 
violates its obligations assumes responsibility in principle therefore.40 
Pierre Pescatore, in commenting on the Fromagerie decision,41 
suggests that the international legal order has s1;1bstance only if it 
34. De Visscher, supra note 22, at 608-09. 
35. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 465. 
36. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 465. 
37. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 474, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1J 8141, at 7620. 
38. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 464. For an earlier development of this argu-
ment, see van der Meersch, Reflexions sur le droit international et la revision de la 
Constitution, [1968] Journal des Tribunaux 494. 
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
art. 27, 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 884 (1969), provides in part that "[a] party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty • • • ." 
40. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 464. 
41. Pescatore, supra note 9, at 579. 
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transcends the internal legal order: Treaties can fulfill their role only 
if they prevail over the unilateral dispositions of states; othenvise, 
they are meaningless scraps of paper. Pescatore characterizes the prob-
lem as an existential one. Thus, the pre-eminence of international 
treaty law is inherent in the very existence of an international legal 
order, as well as in the contractual nature of the treaty. 
The formation of a federal union in the United States provides 
a model of such a system of relationships. In becoming members of 
the union the individual states recognized the United States Consti-
tution as the legal order under which they were united. This places 
them under a duty not to vi9late the Constitution's provisions. If they 
happen to enact laws that do violate some provision of the Constitu-
tion, the state courts must render the laws void. This is a logical and 
necessary extension of the Constitution. The Belgian Supreme Court 
believed that Belgium, as a member of the community of nations, 
recognizes a certain international legal order-even if only estab-
lished by treaty-as the legal order under which it functions with 
other nations. 
In deciding Fromagerie, the Belgian Court may have been en-
couraged by a decision of the Supreme Court of Luxembourg in a 
similar situation. The Luxembourg court found that a treaty ap-
proved by legislative act is a law of superior essence, which has a 
source higher than the will of a domestic organ and consequently 
prevails over any subsequent domestic legislation.42 
It is important to note that, although the Court based the Fro-
magerie decision upon the inherent nature of all treaties, the con-
flict before the Court concerned an article of the treaty creating the 
EEC. One of the principal characteristics of the EEC treaty is that it 
instituted a new legal order that resulted in a transfer of powers from 
the states to the Community and restricted the sovereign rights of the 
member states.43 The nature of this treaty particularly lends itself to 
the conclusion that its provisions are superior to subsequent national 
laws. However, the Court did not limit the application of the prin-
ciple of pre-eminence to the EEC treaty. It reasoned that the princi-
ple should be applied because the Community law is treaty law: 
Whereas, where the conflict is between a rule of internal law and 
a rule of international law that has direct effects.in the internal legal 
system, the rule established by the treaty must prevail; the preem-
inence of the treaty results from the very nature of international 
treaty law; 
42. Chambre des Metiers v. Pagani, 16 Pasicrisie lu.-..:embourgeoise 150 (Cour sup~-
rieure de Justice, cassation aiminelle, Lux. 1954). 
43. Costa v. E.N.EL., 10 Recueil 1141, [1961-1966 Court Decisions Transfer Binder] 
CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 11 8023 (Ct. of Justice of the European Communities 1964). 
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"Whereas, this is so a fortiori where the conflict is, as in this case, 
between a rule of internal law and a rule of Community law .... 44 
Jean Salmon, commenting on Fromagerie, reflected that to protect 
the EEC treaty but not a treaty with the United States or Japan would 
not be logically tenable,45 for this approach would ignore the position 
of the state-and of the EEC itself-in an international context that 
is just as vital as the Community context. He concluded that it is the 
international treaty obligation as such that is accorded pre-eminence, 
irrespective of the subject matter of that obligation or of the identity 
of the contracting parties. 
A consequence of relying upon the nature of all international 
treaties is that no distinction is made as to whether the conflict be-
tween the treaty and the national law was deliberately created by the 
legislature.46 It will be recalled that Belgian judges traditionally at-
tempted to construe away any conflict by assuming that the legislature 
had not intended to violate the treaty; however, when such an as-
sumption could not be made, the subsequent national law prevailed. 
In the future a Belgian judge will be obliged to give effect to the 
treaty, any contrary legislative intent notwithstanding. Once the 
superiority of the rule of international treaty law is deemed to reside 
in its very essence, it would be logically inconsistent to allow the 
legislature to deny that superiority whenever it wishes. That would 
be like saying that the Constitution of the United States is the su-
preme law of the land unless a state legislature says otherwise. 
This does not signify that Belgium is irretrievably bound by the 
provisions of its treaties. A nation that desires to escape from its treaty 
obligations may do so by denouncing the treaty in accordance _with 
the terms of the treaty or accepted principles of international law. 
But it must take those steps permitted by international law and not 
unilateral internal acts that would be the negation of international 
Iaw.41 
As far-reaching as the principle of pre-eminence now appears to 
be, the Court did limit it in some respects. For example, the Court 
spoke only of "international treaty law" and not of "international 
law." Pescatore is of the view that it would be unwise to interpret 
this apparent limitation as an argument against the supremacy of 
nontreaty international law and, notably, of international custom.48 
If the constitutions of some of Belgium's neighboring countries are 
44. [1971) Journal des Tribunaux at 473-74, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 8141, at 
7620 (CCH trans.). 
45. Salmon, supra note 7, at 533. 
46. Id. at 534. 
47. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, arts. 39-72, 63 .AM. J. INTI... L. 887 (1969). 
48. Pescatore, supra note 9, at 582. 
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an indication of a trend, Pescatore may be correct, for they expressly 
incorporate the principle of the supremacy of international law.40 
Henri Rolin suggests that disregard of general principles of inter-
national law, like disregard of international treaty law, renders a 
state internationally answerable.5° Furthermore, he argues, Belgium 
has consented to international judicial control over its compliance 
with both treaties and international law,51 the only reservation being 
that local remedies be exhausted first. It follows that local judicial 
control over the compliance of internal laws with the general prin-
ciples of international law should be given the same scope as control 
over the compliance of internal laws with treaties. Several of the 
proposed amendments to the Belgian Constitution were not as 
limited as the Court's decision, but referred to the supremacy of 
"general rules of international law."52 It must be remembered, how-
ever, that these proposed amendments were never enacted. Ganshof 
van der Meersch, who was influential in their defeat, considered the 
amendments to be overly broad; he thought that the term "general 
rules of international law" was vague and might leave too much dis-
cretion in the judges.53 
A far greater restraint is to be found in the Court's statement that 
only a "rule of international law having direct effect within the 
domestic legal order" prevails over a subsequent provision of domes-
tic law.54 The scope of this limitation is uncertain, even with regard 
to the determination of whether a rule of international treaty law 
has such a direct effect. The precise amount of discretion left to the 
national judges is an open question55-although, with respect to EEC 
treaty provisions, the question of the existence of direct applicability 
49. The basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that "[t]he general 
rules of public international law form part of the Federal law. They take precedence 
over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the Federal 
Territory.'' GRUNDGESETZ, art. 25 (YI. Ger., 1949). The Italian Constitution states that 
"[t)he Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognized principles of interna• 
tional law. The legal status of foreigners is governed by law in conformity with inter• 
national rules and treaties .•.• " CoNmTUZIONE, art. 10 (Italy, 1948). 
50. Rolin, Revision de la Constitution Art. 107 bis, Document de Travail No. 3, '1 
REVUE BELGE DE DROlT INTERNATIONAL 777, 785 (1971). 
51. Id. at 786-87. 
52. See note 23 supra. 
53. Van der Meersch, [1968] Journal des Tribunaux 494, supra note 38, at 496. 
54. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 473, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8141, at 7620, 
55. For example, the Supreme Court of The Netherlands chose to construe narrowly 
the concept of direct applicability in Institut national des appellations d'originc des 
vins et eaux de vie v. J. Mettes, [1958] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 968 (1956), noted in 
Erades, Self-Executing Nature of the Netherlands-French Commercial Treaty of 1935, 
6 NETH. INTL. L. REv. 399 (1959). For a critical discussion of this decision, sec Van 
Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, 58 AM. J. INTL. L, 88, 
101-02 (1964). 
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is finally decided by the European Court of Justice.56 The Belgian 
Court used neither the term "self-executing treaty provision" nor 
the expression suggested by Ganshof van der Meersch-"directly ap-
plicable rule of international law."57 It has been suggested that this 
represents a desire to break away from the narrowness of the former 
concept and adopt the concept adhered to by the European Court of 
Justice.68 In a case dealing with article 12 of the EEC treaty the Eu-
ropean Court decided that the article produced "direct effects" on 
the legal relationship between the member states and their citizens.59 
It so held despite the fact that article 12 is directed at the member 
states themselves and requires them to refrain from engaging in 
certain acts. Although that article does not expressly confer any 
rights upon individuals, the European Court found that it did so by 
implication. The Court went on to state that 
Community law, which is independent of the laws of the Member 
States, while it creates obligations for individuals, also gives rise to 
rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights are 
created, not only when they are explicitly stated by the Treaty, but 
also through obligations which the Treaty lays down in a very definite 
manner for individuals as well as for the Member States and the Com-
munity institutions.60 
The final limit placed on the principle of pre-eminence concerns 
the effect of the treaty's superiority over internal law. The Court held 
that "the effects of the law of March 19, 1968, were '[stayed] inasmuch 
as this law was in conflict with a directly applicable provision of in-
ternational treaty law.' "61 Thus, the Court simply refused to apply 
the law; it did not annul it. Should the treaty cease to be in effect, it 
appears that the law of March 19, 1968, would then be applied. 
The decision in Fromagerie came at a most opportune time. Con-
flicts between treaties and domestic laws are certain to become more 
56. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 
1957, art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. 73. 
57. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 465. 
58. Salmon, supra note 7, at 533. 
59. N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &: Loos v. 
Netherlands Fiscal Administration, 9 Requeil 1, [1961-1966 Court Decisions Transfer 
Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1[ 8008 (Ct. of Justice of the European Communities 
1963). 
60. N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &: Loos v. 
Netherlands Fiscal Administration, 9 Requeil 1, 23, [1961-1966 Court Decisions Transfer 
Binder] CCH Co11r11r. MKT. REP. ,r 8008, at 7214 (Ct. of Justice of the European Com-
munities 1963). 
61. [1971] Journal des Tribunaux at 474, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 8141, at 7620 
(CCH trans.). The CCH translation is "terminated" rather than "stayed." However, the 
French word "arrete" is closer to "stayed" or "suspended." 
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numerous as a result of the development of the EEC and the growth
of the network of international treaties. The Belgian Supreme Court's
decision has greatly enlarged the possibilities for recourse to local
courts for enforcement of treaties by private parties whom such agree-
ments were intended to benefit.
